vmsctl

Ubuntu 22.04 STIG: the 65 controls vmsctl checks

These are 65 of the 188 controls of the DISA Security Technical Implementation Guide for Canonical Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (V2R8) that vmsctl can decide by reading the host, each with what it looks at, why it matters and how to fix it. This is not a complete STIG assessment: the other controls (the audit rules for system calls, file ownership of system commands, smart cards, FIPS, the boot loader password, ...) are not checked yet. The control IDs and importance are the STIG's, a US government work; the titles and texts are vmsctl's own. A check is mapped only when it decides exactly what the STIG requires. On a host that is not Ubuntu 22.04 every control is not applicable.

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/with-developer/vmsctl/main/install.sh | sh
sudo vmsctl scan --profile stig-ubuntu2204

Every result carries its evidence (the value, the file and the line); vmsctl explain UBTU-22-255040 prints a control in the terminal. What the profile covers: docs/stig.md. About the tool: vmsctl.

UBTU-22-211015 Ctrl-Alt-Delete does not reboot the host

Importance high (CAT I)

services.unit-masked A systemd unit that the control forbids is masked

Checks that the systemd unit named by the parameter unit (such as ctrl-alt-del.target) is masked: linked to /dev/null, so nothing can start it. The profile that uses this check says which unit. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. Some units must never run on a server (a key press that reboots it, a service that has no place there); only masking keeps another unit or a person from starting them.

How to fix it. Mask the unit (systemctl mask <unit>).

Values used for this control: unit = ctrl-alt-del.target

UBTU-22-213010 Kernel messages are restricted to privileged users

Importance low (CAT III)

sysctl.dmesg-restrict Only privileged users can read the kernel log

Checks the kernel parameter kernel.dmesg_restrict (1 limits dmesg to privileged users). On a running host the value is what the kernel reports; for a mounted root it is what the files of sysctl.d(5) set at boot, and a parameter they do not set cannot be judged.

Why it matters. The kernel log can show addresses, device details and the traces of failed exploits.

How to fix it. Set kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1 in a file of /etc/sysctl.d and apply it with sysctl --system.

UBTU-22-213020 Address space layout randomization is on

Importance medium (CAT II)

sysctl.aslr Address space layout randomization is fully on

Checks the kernel parameter kernel.randomize_va_space (it must be 2: randomize the stack, libraries and the heap). On a running host the value is what the kernel reports; for a mounted root it is what the files of sysctl.d(5) set at boot, and a parameter they do not set cannot be judged.

Why it matters. Randomized addresses make memory-corruption bugs much harder to turn into working exploits.

How to fix it. Set kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 in a file of /etc/sysctl.d and apply it with sysctl --system.

UBTU-22-215010 The password quality library is installed

Importance medium (CAT II)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = libpam-pwquality

UBTU-22-215015 chrony is installed

Importance low (CAT III)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = chrony

UBTU-22-215020 systemd-timesyncd is not installed

Importance low (CAT III)

packages.absent A package that the control forbids is not installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is not installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A package that is not needed adds code, and often a listening service, that has to be kept patched and can be attacked.

How to fix it. Remove the package with the package manager (for example apt remove <package>).

Values used for this control: package = systemd-timesyncd

UBTU-22-215025 ntp is not installed

Importance low (CAT III)

packages.absent A package that the control forbids is not installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is not installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A package that is not needed adds code, and often a listening service, that has to be kept patched and can be attacked.

How to fix it. Remove the package with the package manager (for example apt remove <package>).

Values used for this control: package = ntp

UBTU-22-215030 The rsh server is not installed

Importance high (CAT I)

packages.absent A package that the control forbids is not installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is not installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A package that is not needed adds code, and often a listening service, that has to be kept patched and can be attacked.

How to fix it. Remove the package with the package manager (for example apt remove <package>).

Values used for this control: package = rsh-server

UBTU-22-215035 The telnet server is not installed

Importance high (CAT I)

packages.absent A package that the control forbids is not installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is not installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A package that is not needed adds code, and often a listening service, that has to be kept patched and can be attacked.

How to fix it. Remove the package with the package manager (for example apt remove <package>).

Values used for this control: package = telnetd

UBTU-22-215040 The NFS server is not installed

Importance medium (CAT II)

packages.absent A package that the control forbids is not installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is not installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A package that is not needed adds code, and often a listening service, that has to be kept patched and can be attacked.

How to fix it. Remove the package with the package manager (for example apt remove <package>).

Values used for this control: package = nfs-kernel-server

UBTU-22-251010 ufw is installed

Importance medium (CAT II)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = ufw

UBTU-22-251015 ufw is turned on

Importance medium (CAT II)

firewall.ufw-active ufw is turned on

Checks that /etc/ufw/ufw.conf sets ENABLED=yes, which is what makes ufw filter at boot (installing the package enables its unit, so the unit alone says nothing). Without ufw there is nothing to turn on, and the check fails: it is for profiles that require ufw itself, such as the Ubuntu STIG; firewall.enabled accepts any host firewall.

Why it matters. Without a firewall, every service that listens on an address is open to everyone who can reach it.

How to fix it. Allow what the host serves and turn ufw on: ufw allow 22/tcp, then ufw enable. Allow your own SSH connection first.

UBTU-22-251020 The ufw service starts at boot

Importance medium (CAT II)

services.unit-enabled A systemd unit that the control requires is enabled

Checks that the systemd unit named by the parameter unit (such as ssh.service) is enabled, so it starts at boot, and not masked. The profile that uses this check says which unit. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a service to run cannot be met if the service does not start by itself.

How to fix it. Enable the unit (systemctl enable --now <unit>) and unmask it if it is masked (systemctl unmask <unit>).

Values used for this control: unit = ufw.service

UBTU-22-253010 TCP SYN cookies are on

Importance medium (CAT II)

sysctl.syncookies TCP SYN cookies are on

Checks the kernel parameter net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies (1: answer a flood of connection attempts with cookies once the queue is full). On a running host the value is what the kernel reports; for a mounted root it is what the files of sysctl.d(5) set at boot, and a parameter they do not set cannot be judged.

Why it matters. SYN cookies keep a flood of half-open connections from using up the memory of the connection queue.

How to fix it. Set net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 in a file of /etc/sysctl.d and apply it with sysctl --system.

UBTU-22-255010 The SSH server is installed

Importance high (CAT I)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = openssh-server

UBTU-22-255015 The SSH service starts at boot

Importance high (CAT I)

services.unit-enabled A systemd unit that the control requires is enabled

Checks that the systemd unit named by the parameter unit (such as ssh.service) is enabled, so it starts at boot, and not masked. The profile that uses this check says which unit. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a service to run cannot be met if the service does not start by itself.

How to fix it. Enable the unit (systemctl enable --now <unit>) and unmask it if it is masked (systemctl unmask <unit>).

Values used for this control: unit = ssh.service

UBTU-22-255025 SSH allows no empty passwords and no user environment

Importance high (CAT I)

ssh.permit-empty-passwords SSH does not accept empty passwords

Checks the global PermitEmptyPasswords setting of the OpenSSH server. On a live host the effective value comes from sshd -T, so the default of the installed version counts.

Why it matters. An account without a password would let anyone log in over the network.

How to fix it. Set PermitEmptyPasswords no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or a file it includes) and reload sshd.

ssh.permit-user-environment SSH does not let users set the environment

Checks the global PermitUserEnvironment setting of the OpenSSH server. On a live host the effective value comes from sshd -T, so the default of the installed version counts.

Why it matters. Environment settings from a user's own files can change how the login shell and PAM modules behave, which defeats restrictions set for the account.

How to fix it. Set PermitUserEnvironment no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or a file it includes) and reload sshd.

UBTU-22-255040 SSH does not forward X11

Importance high (CAT I)

ssh.x11-forwarding SSH does not forward X11

Checks the global X11Forwarding setting of the OpenSSH server. On a live host the effective value comes from sshd -T, so the default of the installed version counts.

Why it matters. X11 forwarding exposes the client's display to the server, and anything that controls the server can then watch or drive it.

How to fix it. Set X11Forwarding no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or a file it includes) and reload sshd.

UBTU-22-411010 The root account is locked

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.root-locked The root account has no password that can log in

Checks in /etc/shadow that the root account is locked (its password field starts with "!" or is "*"), so no password logs in as root. Administrators use their own accounts and sudo. Without /etc/shadow there is nothing to check, so the check cannot pass.

Why it matters. A root password is a shared secret for the most powerful account, which anyone can guess or leak and which says nothing about who used it.

How to fix it. Lock the root password (passwd -l root) after an administrator has an account in the sudo group.

UBTU-22-411015 Every account has its own UID

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.unique-uids Every account has its own UID

Lists accounts that share a UID with another account.

Why it matters. Accounts sharing a UID are the same user to the kernel, so access and audit trails cannot tell them apart.

How to fix it. Give each account a unique UID (usermod -u) and fix the ownership of its files.

UBTU-22-411025 A password cannot be changed again within a day

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.password-min-age Passwords cannot be changed back at once

Checks PASS_MIN_DAYS in /etc/login.defs, the minimum days between password changes.

Why it matters. Without a minimum age, a user can cycle through passwords in minutes to get back to the old one and defeat the password history.

How to fix it. Set PASS_MIN_DAYS 1 (or more) in /etc/login.defs.

Values used for this control: min_days = 1

UBTU-22-411030 A password expires after 60 days

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.password-max-age Passwords expire

Checks PASS_MAX_DAYS in /etc/login.defs, the maximum password age given to new accounts. Without it, shadow-utils uses -1, which means passwords never expire.

Why it matters. A password that never changes stays useful to whoever obtained it.

How to fix it. Set PASS_MAX_DAYS in /etc/login.defs to the required number of days (90 or less by default; a stricter profile or configuration asks for fewer, such as 60); apply it to existing accounts with chage.

Values used for this control: max_days = 60

UBTU-22-412030 An idle shell session ends after 15 minutes

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.session-timeout-set Idle shells time out

Checks that the system-wide startup files (/etc/environment, /etc/profile and the files it reads, such as /etc/profile.d) leave TMOUT set to a positive number of seconds, so that it applies to every user's login shell: a value set only in root's own files does not count, assignments inside if or case blocks do not count, and a later unset removes it.

Why it matters. An unattended logged-in terminal can be used by anyone who reaches it.

How to fix it. Add TMOUT=600 and readonly TMOUT and export TMOUT to a file in /etc/profile.d.

accounts.session-timeout-value The idle timeout is short enough

Lists TMOUT assignments that are empty, zero or longer than max_seconds, and unset TMOUT commands, including those inside if or case blocks, which can apply to some sessions.

Why it matters. A long or disabled timeout leaves idle sessions open.

How to fix it. Set TMOUT to the required number of seconds (600 or less by default; a stricter profile or configuration asks for fewer) and remove larger assignments and unset commands.

Values used for this control: max_seconds = 900

UBTU-22-431010 AppArmor is installed

Importance medium (CAT II)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = apparmor

UBTU-22-611035 A password has at least 15 characters

Importance medium (CAT II)

accounts.password-min-length Passwords have a minimum length

Checks that the passwd service's PAM stack enforces password quality (pam_pwquality or pam_cracklib, not in warning-only mode) with a minimum length of at least min_length characters. Positive credits let a password be shorter by up to their sum, so they count against minlen.

Why it matters. Short passwords fall quickly to guessing and offline cracking.

How to fix it. Enable pam_pwquality in the password stack (authselect, pam-auth-update), set minlen in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to the required length (8 or more by default; a stricter profile or configuration asks for more, such as 15), and do not set enforcing = 0 or positive credits.

Values used for this control: min_length = 15

UBTU-22-611065 No account has an empty password

Importance high (CAT I)

accounts.no-empty-passwords No account has an empty password

Lists the accounts whose password field in /etc/shadow is empty, which means no password is needed to use them wherever PAM accepts it (the nullok option of pam_unix, which some default configurations still carry). Locked accounts ("!" or "*") are not listed. Without /etc/shadow there is nothing to check, so the check cannot pass.

Why it matters. An account without a password lets anyone who can reach a login prompt, a console or su use it.

How to fix it. Set a password for each listed account (passwd user), or lock it (passwd -l user). Remove nullok from the pam_unix lines in the PAM configuration so an empty password is refused.

UBTU-22-653010 The audit daemon is installed

Importance medium (CAT II)

packages.installed A package that the control requires is installed

Checks that the package named by the parameter package is installed (dpkg or rpm). The profile that uses this check says which package; a package that was removed but left its configuration files, or that is only unpacked or half configured, is not installed. Only a profile sets the parameter.

Why it matters. A control that needs a security tool or a service on the host cannot be met without its package.

How to fix it. Install the package with the package manager (for example apt install <package>).

Values used for this control: package = auditd

UBTU-22-654010 Every use of apparmor_parser is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /sbin/apparmor_parser

UBTU-22-654015 Every use of chacl is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/chacl

UBTU-22-654020 Every use of chage is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/chage

UBTU-22-654025 Every use of chcon is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/chcon

UBTU-22-654030 Every use of chfn is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/chfn

UBTU-22-654035 Every use of chsh is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/chsh

UBTU-22-654040 Every use of crontab is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/crontab

UBTU-22-654045 Every use of fdisk is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/sbin/fdisk, perms = x

UBTU-22-654050 Every use of gpasswd is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/gpasswd

UBTU-22-654055 Every use of kmod is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /bin/kmod, perms = x

UBTU-22-654060 Every use of modprobe is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /sbin/modprobe, perms = x

UBTU-22-654065 Every use of mount is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/mount

UBTU-22-654070 Every use of newgrp is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/newgrp

UBTU-22-654075 Every use of pam_timestamp_check is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check

UBTU-22-654080 Every use of passwd is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/passwd

UBTU-22-654085 Every use of setfacl is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/setfacl

UBTU-22-654090 Every use of ssh-agent is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/ssh-agent

UBTU-22-654095 Every use of ssh-keysign is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign

UBTU-22-654100 Every use of su is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /bin/su

UBTU-22-654105 Every use of sudo is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/sudo

UBTU-22-654110 Every use of sudoedit is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/sudoedit

UBTU-22-654115 Every use of umount is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/bin/umount

UBTU-22-654120 Every use of unix_update is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /sbin/unix_update

UBTU-22-654125 Every use of usermod is audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.command-audited The audit rules record every use of a command that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) have a rule for the program named by the parameter path, in the form that the STIG gives for commands: -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (also written -1), so that what a logged-in user runs is recorded. A watch (-w) or a rule without the two auid filters does not count. It reads the files, not the running kernel. Only a profile sets the parameter. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. A privileged program that is not audited can be run without a record of who ran it.

How to fix it. Add the rule for the program to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/chage -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k privileged-chage) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /usr/sbin/usermod

UBTU-22-654130 Changes to /etc/group are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/group, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654135 Changes to /etc/gshadow are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/gshadow, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654140 Changes to /etc/security/opasswd are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/security/opasswd, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654145 Changes to /etc/passwd are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/passwd, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654150 Changes to /etc/shadow are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/shadow, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654190 Changes to the systemd journal files are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/journal, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654195 Changes to /var/log/btmp are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/btmp, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654200 Changes to /var/log/wtmp are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/wtmp, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654205 Changes to /var/run/utmp are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/run/utmp, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654210 Changes to /var/log/faillog are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/faillog, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654215 Changes to /var/log/lastlog are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/lastlog, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654220 Changes to /etc/sudoers are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/sudoers, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654225 Changes to /etc/sudoers.d are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /etc/sudoers.d, perms = wa

UBTU-22-654235 Changes to /var/log/sudo.log are audited

Importance medium (CAT II)

audit.path-audited The audit rules watch a path that the control names

Checks that the audit rules the host loads at boot (/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules, or /etc/audit/audit.rules without them) audit the path named by the parameter path for the permissions named by perms (r, w, a, x, in that order, such as wa or x): a watch (-w /etc/passwd -p wa) or an always,exit rule with path= and perm=, for any user. The profile that uses this check says which path and permissions. It reads the files, not the running kernel: a rule added with auditctl since boot is not seen. A rule that is narrowed by another filter (a user, an exit code), and a path with a never rule, do not count; a rule on a directory (dir=) counts for the directory only, so name the path the rule names. Only a profile sets the parameters. Not applicable to a container image.

Why it matters. Without a record of who changed a security file or ran a privileged program, an incident cannot be investigated or attributed.

How to fix it. Add a rule for the path to a file in /etc/audit/rules.d (for example -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k usergroup_modification) and load it with augenrules --load.

Values used for this control: path = /var/log/sudo.log, perms = wa